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Abstract
There are games with a unique Nash equilibrium but such that,
for almost all initial conditions, all strategies in the support of this
equilibrium are eliminated by the replicator dynamics and the best-
reply dynamics.
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1 Introduction
Evolutionary game dynamics model the evolution of the mean behavior in pop-
ulations of agents interacting strategically. A most studied topic is the link
between the outcome of these dynamics and Nash equilibria. Many positive
∗E-mail: viossat ατ ceremade.dauphine.fr.
†The author thanks Sylvain Sorin, for patient and painful hours spent trying to decipher
a first version of this article. The support of the ANR RISK and of the Fondation du Risque
(Chaire Groupama) is gratefully acknowledged. All errors are mine.
1
connections have been found, including convergence to the set of Nash equilib-
ria for many dynamics in special classes of games (Sandholm, 2010). In general
though, solutions of evolutionary game dynamics need not converge to the set
of Nash equilibria (Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998, section 8.6). By contrast
with no-regret dynamics (e.g., Hart, 2005 and references therein), replacing
Nash equilibria by correlated equilibria and convergence of the solutions by
convergence of some time-average hardly helps: for many dynamics, there are
examples of games with a unique Nash equilibrium, which is also the unique
correlated equilibrium, but such that, for some initial conditions, all strategies
in the support of this equilibrium are eliminated (Viossat, 2007, 2008).
In these examples however, the Nash equilibrium is strict and thus asymp-
totically stable under reasonable dynamics. This leads to the following ques-
tion: are there games such that all strategies in the support of Nash equilibria
are eliminated for almost all initial conditions? This article shows that the
answer is positive, at least for the two most studied dynamics: the replicator
dynamics (REP) and the best-reply dynamics (BR). For BR, we exhibit an
open set of such games.
Our examples are relatively high dimensional: 6 × 6 games for BR and
7× 7 for REP. The reason why we need an extra-dimension for the replicator
dynamics seems purely technical: our examples for the best-reply dynamics
should work as well for the replicator dynamics, but this is not so easy to
prove, as the replicator dynamics is more difficult to analyze than the best-
reply dynamics.
The reason why our games are relatively high dimensional is deeper: first,
by the folk-theorem of evolutionary game theory (Weibull, 1995, Prop. 4.11),
if an interior trajectory of REP or BR converges to a point, then this point is a
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Nash equilibrium. Thus, we need nonconvergent trajectories, and along which,
asymptotically, only strategies that do not belong to the support of a Nash
equilibrium have positive probability. For single population dynamics, this
seems to require at least three strategies not in the support of Nash equilibria.
Moreover, the only solution for having a unique strategy in the support of at
least one Nash equilibrium is to have a unique, pure Nash equilibrium. But
such a Nash equilibrium would be strict, hence asymptotically stable:
Proposition 1.1. In a bimatrix game, a unique and pure Nash equilibrium is
strict.
Proof. A Nash equilibrium is quasi-strict if each player puts positive weight
on each of her pure best-replies. In a bimatrix game, if a Nash equilibrium is
unique, then it is quasi-strict (Jansen, 1981; Norde, 1999); if it is unique and
pure, it is quasi-strict and pure, hence strict.
We thus need at least two strategies in the support of Nash equilibria. With
the three strategies not in the support of equilibria, this makes at least five
strategies. Our examples for the best-reply dynamics are 6 × 6 games: there
might be room for improvement, but not much.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows: the framework and
the notation are introduced below. Section 2 studies the behavior of the best-
reply dynamics in a family of 6 × 6 games. Section 3 studies the replicator
dynamics in a specific 7 × 7 game. Section 4 concludes. Appendix A shows
that the games we study have a unique Nash equilibrium. Appendix B studies
the behavior of the best-reply dynamics in the 7× 7 game of Section 3.
Notation and definitions. We study single-population dynamics in two-player,
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finite symmetric games. The set of pure strategies is I = {1, 2, .., N} and the
payoff matrix is U = (uij)1≤i,j≤N . Thus, uij is the payoff of an individual
playing strategy i against an individual playing strategy j. Let SN denote the
simplex of mixed strategies (henceforth, “the simplex”):
SN =
{
x ∈ RI+ :
∑
i∈I
xi = 1
}
.
Its vertices ei, 1 ≤ i ≤ N , correspond to the pure strategies of the game. Note
that vectors and matrices are denoted by bold characters.
Denote by xi(t) the proportion of the population playing strategy i at time t
and by x(t) = (x1(t), ..., xN(t)) ∈ SN the population profile (or mean strategy).
We often omit time arguments and write x for x(t). We study the evolution
of the population profile under the two most studied dynamics: the replicator
dynamics and the best-reply dynamics.
The replicator dynamics (Taylor and Jonker, 1978) may be derived by
assuming that the per capita growth rate of the total number of individuals
playing strategy i is the payoff of the game.1 For frequencies of strategies, this
leads to:
x˙i = xi [(Ux)i − x ·Ux] (REP)
The right-hand side is Lipschitz in x, hence there is a unique solution
through each initial condition. This solution is interior if xi(t) > 0 for all
i ∈ I and all t ∈ R. Since the faces of the simplex are invariant under (REP),
this boils down to the initial condition being interior; that is, xi(0) > 0 for all
i in I.
The best-reply dynamics (Gilboa and Matsui, 1991; Matsui, 1992) may
be derived by assuming that in each small time interval, a fraction of the
1Or, up to a change of time, a background fitness plus the payoff of the game.
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population revises its strategy and switches (rationally, but myopically) to a
best-reply to the current population profile. Since this best-reply need not
be unique, this does not lead to a differential equation but to the differential
inclusion:
x˙ ∈ BR(x)− x (BR)
where BR(x) = {y ∈ SN : y · Ux = maxz∈SN z · Ux} denotes the set of
mixed best-replies to x. A solution of the best-reply dynamics is an absolutely
continuous function x : R+ → SN satisfying (BR) for almost every t. Solutions
exist for each initial condition, but need not be unique.
Other definitions. The limit set of a solution x(·) of a given dynamics is
the set of accumulation points of x(t) as t → +∞. A pure strategy i belongs
to the support of a Nash equilibrium of a symmetric bimatrix game if there
is a Nash equilibrium (x,y) such that xi > 0 (or equivalently, due to the
symmetry of the game, a Nash equilibrium (x,y) such that yi > 0). Finally,
the pure strategy i is eliminated (for a given solution x(·) of a given dynamics)
if xi(t)→ 0 as t→ +∞.
We show that there are games with a unique Nash equilibrium but such
that, under the best-reply dynamics and the replicator dynamics, all strate-
gies in the support of this equilibrium are eliminated for almost all initial
conditions.
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2 Best-reply dynamics
2.1 A reminder on Rock-Paper-Scissors
A general Rock-Paper-Scissors game (RPS) is a 3 × 3 symmetric game with
payoff matrix 

a1 b2 c3
c1 a2 b3
b1 c2 a3

 with bi < ai < ci, i = 1, 2, 3. (1)
(As the game is symmetric, we only indicate the payoffs of the row player.)
These games have a unique Nash equilibrium. It is symmetric and completely
mixed. We say that the game is outward cycling if
3∏
i=1
(ai − bi) >
3∏
i=1
(ci − ai) (2)
In that case, almost all solutions of the best-reply dynamics converge to a
triangle, which Gaunersdorfer and Hofbauer (1995) called the Shapley triangle
after Shapley (1964). It is defined by
ST = {x ∈ S3 : V (x) = 0} with V (x) = max
1≤i≤3
(Ux)i −
∑
1≤i≤3
aixi (3)
Proposition 2.1 (Gaunersdorfer and Hofbauer, 1995). In an outward cycling
RPS game, for every initial condition different from the equilibrium, the so-
lution of the best-reply dynamics is uniquely defined and its limit set is the
Shapley triangle (3). 2
2If
∏
3
i=1(ai − bi) =
∏
3
i=1(ci − ai), e.g., if the game is zero-sum, the Shapley triangle is
degenerate and coincides with the equilibrium; if
∏
3
i=1(ai− bi) <
∏
3
i=1(ci−ai), the Shapley
triangle is empty. In both cases, all solutions of the best-reply dynamics converge to the
equilibrium.
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A RPS game has cyclic symmetry if the payoffs ai, bi, ci are independent
of i. The Nash equilibrium is then (1/3, 1/3, 1/3) and, up to a rescaling that
does not affect the equilibrium nor the dynamics we study, the payoffs may be
taken of the form:

0 −α β
β 0 −α
−α β 0

 with α > 0, β > 0. (4)
The outward cycling condition (2) then boils down to α > β, and the Shapley
triangle (3) to
ST =
{
x ∈ S3 : max
1≤i≤3
(Ux)i = 0
}
. (5)
We now describe in detail the behavior of the best-reply dynamics in RPS
games, and give a sketch of proof of Proposition 2.1, as this allows to introduce
some crucial tools. The first one is a version of the improvement principle
(Monderer and Sela, 1997). It says that when the solution of the best-reply
dynamics points towards a pure best-reply i, only certain strategies can become
best-replies: those that are better replies to i than i itself.
Lemma 2.2 (Improvement principle). Let x(·) be a solution of the best-reply
dynamics. Assume that on the interval ]T, T ′[, with T < T ′, the unique best-
reply to x(t) is strategy i. If strategy j 6= i is a best-reply to x(T ′) then
uji > uii.
Proof. See Viossat (2008, Lemma 4.2).
Assume for instance that in a RPS game, strategy 1 is currently the unique
best-reply to the population profile x(t), so that the solution points towards e1;
that is, x˙ = e1 − x. Since (e1, e1) is not a Nash equilibrium, a new best-reply
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must arise. By the improvement principle, this can only be strategy 2. The
solution then points towards the edge e1 − e2. Since in the game restricted
to strategies 1 and 2, strategy 2 strictly dominates strategy 1, strategy 2
immediately becomes the unique best-reply. Therefore the solution points
towards e2, then towards e3, then towards e1 again,...
By itself, this cyclic behaviour does not preclude convergence to equilib-
rium. Actually, if
∏3
i=1(ai−bi) <
∏3
i=1(ci−ai) then the solutions cycle inwards,
and the times at which their direction change accumulate as x(t) converges,
in finite time, to the equilibrium (Gaunersdorfer and Hofbauer, 1995).
However, for outward cycling RPS games and for solutions that do not
start at the equilibrium, this cyclic behavior goes on forever. This follows
from the following observations, which we do not prove. Below, the function
V is defined in (3) and v(t) = V (x(t)).
(i) If the game is outward cycling, then V (x) is zero on the Shapley triangle,
positive outside it, and negative inside, with its unique minimum attained at
the equilibrium point.
(ii) When the solution points towards a pure strategy (that is, x˙ = ei − x
for some i), then v˙(t) = −v(t).
Consider a solution that does not start at the equilibrium. Combining (i),
(ii), and the above described cyclic behavior, we get that the solution cannot
approach the equilibrium, therefore the times at which the direction changes
cannot accumulate and the cyclic behavior goes on for ever; thus, by (ii),
v(t)→ 0 hence x(t)→ ST . The limit set of the solution is then easily seen to
be the whole triangle.
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2.2 A 6× 6 game
Consider the following 6× 6 symmetric game:

0 −3 1 −1 −1 −1
1 0 −3 −1 −1 −1
−3 1 0 −1 −1 −1
−4 −4 3 0 −5 1
−1 −1 −3 1 0 −5
−1 −1 −3 −5 1 0


(6)
Let G123 and G456 denote the 3× 3 games obtained from (6) by restricting the
players to their three first and to their three last strategies, respectively. Both
G123 and G456 are outward cycling RPS games with cyclic symmetry. Their
unique Nash equilibrium correspond in the whole game to, respectively:
n123 =
(
1
3
,
1
3
,
1
3
, 0, 0, 0
)
and n456 =
(
0, 0, 0,
1
3
,
1
3
,
1
3
)
The payoffs are chosen so that (n123,n123) be a Nash equilibrium of (6) but
not (n456,n456).
Proposition 2.3. The game (6) has a unique Nash equilibrium: (n123,n123).
Proof. See Appendix A.
Proposition 2.3 does not only state that (n123,n123) is the unique symmet-
ric Nash equilibrium, but also that there are no asymmetric Nash equilibria.
Nevertheless, from almost all initial conditions, all strategies in its support are
eliminated. More precisely, let ST456 denote the Shapley triangle:
ST456 =
{
x : x4 + x5 + x6 = 1 and max
4≤i≤6
(Ux)i = 0
}
(7)
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Proposition 2.4. For almost every mixed strategy x in S6, there is a unique
solution x(·) of (BR) such that x(0) = x, and its limit set is the Shapley
triangle ST456.
Proof. The proof relies on the improvement principle and the better-reply
structure of the game, described in Fig. 1 below:
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔❚
❚
❚
❚
❚
❚
❚
❚
❚
❚
❚
❚ ✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔❚
❚
❚
❚
❚
❚
❚
❚
❚
❚
❚
❚❅
 
❅
 
❊❊✭ ✂✂
P
❅
 
❊❊✭ ✂✂
P
1 6
2 3 4 5
Figure 1: Better-replies to pure strategies in game (6). An arrow from i to j means
that uij > uii.
Consider a solution x(·) of the best-reply dynamics. We may assume that
there is a unique best-reply to x = x(0), since this holds for almost all x in
S6. There are then two cases.
Case 1: the unique best-reply to x(0) is strategy 4, 5 or 6. Assume for
concreteness that this is strategy 4. The improvement principle (Lemma 2.2)
and the same reasoning as for RPS games imply that the solution first points
towards e4, then towards e5, then towards e6, then towards e4 again, in a cyclic
fashion. It may be shown exactly as in (Viossat, 2008, p.33) that the times
at which the direction of the solution changes do not accumulate.3 It follows
3The idea is to show that the function W (x) = max4≤i6=j≤6[(Ux)i − (Ux)j ] is bounded
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that this cyclic behavior goes on for ever. Therefore, strategies 1, 2 and 3
never become best-replies, hence xi(t) = xi(0)e
−t → 0 for all i in {1, 2, 3}.
Moreover, when strategy i ∈ {4, 5, 6} is the unique best-reply, the function
v(t) = max4≤i≤6(Ux)i(t) is equal to v(t) = (Ux)i(t) = ei ·Ux(t) and satisfies:
v˙ = ei ·Ux˙ = ei ·U(ei − x) = −ei ·Ux = −v (8)
Therefore v(t)→ 0, hence x(t)→ ST456 as t→ +∞.
Case 2: the unique best-reply to x(0) is strategy 1, 2 or 3. Assume for
concreteness that this is strategy 4. If none of the strategies 4, 5 and 6 ever
becomes a best-reply, the solution points towards e1, then towards e2, then
towards e3, etc., and due to the same reasoning as in case 1, its limit set will
be the Shapley triangle
ST123 =
{
x : x1 + x2 + x3 = 1 and max
1≤i≤3
(Ux)i = 0
}
.
This is impossible, because the payoffs are such that at one of the vertices of
this triangle, the closest to e3, strategy 4 is the unique best-reply. This vertex
is given by 1
13
(1, 3, 9, 0, 0, 0), see Gaunersdofer and Hofbauer (1995, Eq. (3.6)).
Thus, there exists a first time T > 0 at which one of the strategies 4, 5
and 6 becomes a best-reply. Due to the improvement principle and to the
better-reply structure of the game (Fig. 1), this can only be strategy 4, and
just before T , the unique best-reply was strategy 3.
There are then two subcases:
Subcase 2.1 : the pure best-replies at time T are strategies 1, 3 and 4 (that
is, strategies 1 and 4 become best-replies at the same time). The dynamics then
admits several solutions and becomes more difficult to analyze. Fortunately,
away from zero.
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the solution can be precisely traced back in time (in backward time, starting
from T, it moves away from e3 along a straight line, then away from e2,...). It
follows that the set of initial conditions for which this case occurs is contained
in the intersection of the simplex with a countable union of hyperplanes of RN ,
none of which contains the simplex. Therefore, this set has Lebesgue measure
zero (with respect to the simplex) and we can neglect this case.
Subcase 2.2 : the pure best-replies at time T are strategies 3 and 4. The
solution will then point towards the edge e3 − e4. Since in the game reduced
to strategies 3 and 4, strategy 4 strictly dominates strategy 3, it follows that
strategy 4 becomes the unique best-reply and we are back to case 1.
Robustness to perturbations of the payoffs. The above proof uses only strict
inequalities, which are unaffected by sufficiently small perturbations of the
payoffs (the only modification is that the Shapley triangles and the underlying
functions V must be defined as in (3) because the diagonal terms need no
longer be zero). Moreover, since the game is a bimatrix game with a unique
Nash equilibrium, it follows that any game in its neighborhood has a unique
Nash equilibrium, and with the same support (Jansen, 1981). Therefore:
Proposition 2.5. There exists a neighborhood of game (6) such that, for any
symmetric game in this neighborhood, the unique Nash equilibrium has support
in {1, 2, 3} × {1, 2, 3}, but for almost all initial conditions, strategies 1, 2 and
3 are eliminated by the best-reply dynamics.
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3 Replicator Dynamics
Up to a further rescaling, the payoff matrix of an outward cycling RPS game
with cyclic symmetry (4) may be taken of the form:

0 −1 ε
ε 0 −1
−1 ε 0

 with 0 < ε < 1 (9)
The behavior of the replicator dynamics in such games is well known. The
boundary Γ = {x ∈ S3 : x1x2x3 = 0} forms a heteroclinic cycle, that is, a
globally invariant set consisting of saddle rest-points and saddle orbits con-
necting these rest-points. Moreover:
Proposition 3.1. [Zeeman, 1980; Gaunersdorfer and Hofbauer, 1995] In
game (9), the set Γ is asymptotically stable, all interior solutions that do not
start at the equilibrium (1/3, 1/3, 1/3) converge to Γ and the limit set of their
time-average is the Shapley triangle (5).
(If y(·) is a solution of (REP), its time-average at t 6= 0 is 1
t
∫ t
0
y(s) ds.)
Two other facts will prove useful: first, in game (9), the mean payoff is
always nonpositive:
Lemma 3.2. Let U denote the payoff matrix (9): ∀x ∈ S3,x ·Ux ≤ 0
Proof. A standard computation shows that x · Ux = (−1+ε)
2
[
1−
∑3
i=1 x
2
i
]
which is nonnegative since x ∈ S3.
Second, as computed by Gaunersdorfer and Hofbauer (1995, Eq. (3.6)),
the vertex of the Shapley triangle closest to e3 is given by
q¯ =
1
1 + ε+ ε2
(ε2, ε, 1) (10)
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Consider a solution y(·) of the replicator dynamics that does not start at
the equilibrium. Proposition 3.1 implies that q¯ is an accumulation point of
the time-average of y(t). Moreover, for ε small enough (ε < 1/4 suffices),
4q¯3 − 3 > 0; this implies the following result:
lim sup
∫ t
0
(4y3(s)− 3)ds = +∞ (11)
Now consider the following 7× 7 symmetric game:

0 −1 ε −10 −1/3 + ε −1/3 + ε −1/3 + ε
ε 0 −1 −10 −1/3 + ε −1/3 + ε −1/3 + ε
−1 ε 0 −10 −1/3 + ε −1/3 + ε −1/3 + ε
−2 −2 2 0 −1/3 −1/3 −1/3
−1/3 −1/3 −1/3 10 0 −1 ε
−1/3 −1/3 −1/3 10 ε 0 −1
−1/3 −1/3 −1/3 10 −1 ε 0


(12)
with ε > 0 small enough.4 The games obtained by restricting both players to
their three first or to their three last strategies are outward cycling Rock-Paper-
Scissors games with cyclic symmetry. The Nash equilibria of these games
correspond in the whole game to rest points of the replicator dynamics, which
we denote by n123 and n567:
n123 =
(
1
3
,
1
3
,
1
3
, 0, 0, 0, 0
)
; n567 =
(
0, 0, 0, 0,
1
3
,
1
3
,
1
3
)
The heteroclinic cycles of the RPS games correspond to heteroclinic cycles of
the whole game, which we denote by Γ123 and Γ567:
Γ123 = {x ∈ S7 : x1 + x2 + x3 = 1 and x1x2x3 = 0};
4In the proofs, for simplicity, we use ε < 1/48, but the results extend easily to ε < 1/6,
and probably beyond.
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Γ567 = {x ∈ S7 : x5 + x6 + x7 = 1 and x5x6x7 = 0}.
Proposition 3.3. (n123,n123) is the unique Nash equilibrium of game (12)
5
Proof. See Appendix A
In spite of Proposition 3.3, the heteroclinic cycle Γ123 is not asymptotically
stable. Indeed, at e3, the unique best-reply is strategy 4. By contrast, though
(n567,n567) is not an equilibrium of (12):
Proposition 3.4. The heteroclinic cycle Γ567 is asymptotically stable.
Proof. Γ567 is asymptotically stable on the face spanned by e5, e6, e7 due to
Proposition 3.1. Moreover, near the vertices e5 to e7, the payoffs of strategies
1 to 4 are less than the mean payoff, hence the shares of strategies 4 to 7
decrease. Then apply Thm. 17.5.1 of Hofbauer and Sigmund (1998).
Thus, if a solution of the replicator dynamics approaches Γ567 arbitrarily
closely, then it converges to it. We will show that this occurs for almost all
initial conditions. Together with Proposition 3.3, this implies that for almost
all initial conditions, all pure strategies in the support of the unique equilibrium
of game (12) are eliminated.
Roughly, if the solution starts close to the equilibrium, then it first spirals
towards the heteroclinic cycle Γ123. Eventually, it spends enough time close to
e3, where the unique best-reply is strategy 4, for x4 to increase substantially.
Since strategies 5, 6, and 7 have very good payoffs again strategy 4, this triggers
a subsequent increase in x5, x6 and x7. The solution then cycles towards Γ567.
However, x4 then decreases, which may lead to a come-back of strategies 1,
5There are no asymmetric Nash equilibria.
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2, 3, and the whole process might start again. The difficulty is to make sure
that, each time this process runs, the solution gets closer to Γ567.
For the replicator dynamic, this can be shown due to the last important
property of game (12): against strategies 4 to 7, strategies 1 to 3 have the same
payoffs. That is, for any i, i′ in {1, 2, 3} and any j in {4, 5, 6, 7}, uij = ui′j.
Similarly, against strategies 1 to 4, strategies 5 to 7 have the same payoffs.
Due to linearity properties of the replicator dynamics, this implies that the
dynamics may be decomposed as we now explain.
Let x(·) be an interior solution of the replicator dynamics. For each i in
{1, 2, 3}, define x¯i(t) as the share of strategy i at time t relative to the total
share of strategies 1, 2 and 3:
x¯i :=
xi
x1 + x2 + x3
(13)
and let x¯ = (x¯1, x¯2, x¯3). For i ∈ {5, 6, 7}, define similarly:
xˆi :=
xi
x5 + x6 + x7
(14)
and let xˆ = (xˆ5, xˆ6, xˆ7). Finally, let
λ(t) = x1(t) + x2(t) + x3(t) and µ(t) = x5(t) + x6(t) + x7(t)
denote respectively the total share of the three first and of the three last
strategies at time t. The evolution of x is fully described by the joint evolution
of x¯, xˆ, λ and µ. The interest of this description is that, up to a change in
velocity, x¯ and xˆ follow the replicator dynamics of the Rock-Paper-Scissors
game (9).
Formally, let τ¯ (t) denote the rescaled time
τ¯(t) :=
∫ t
0
λ(s)ds (15)
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Let both U¯ and Uˆ denote the payoff matrix (9), depending on whether it arises
as the top-left or the bottom-right corner of game (12).6
Lemma 3.5. Let y(·) denote the solution of (REP) in the RPS game (9), with
initial condition y(0) = x¯(0). We have:
˙¯xi = λx¯i
[
(U¯x¯)i − x¯ · U¯x¯
]
∀i = 1, 2, 3 (16)
∀t ∈ R, x¯(t) = y(τ¯(t)) (17)
Proof. The proof of (16) is the same as the proof of Lemma 5.2 of Viossat
(2007). Due to (16), y(τ¯ (t)) and x¯(t) are solutions of the same differential
equation, which admits a unique solution through each initial condition. This
proves (17).
Similarly, if z(·) is the solution of the replicator dynamics in game (9) with
initial condition z(0) = xˆ(0), and τˆ (t) is the rescaled time
τˆ(t) =
∫ t
0
µ(s)ds (18)
then
∀t ∈ R, xˆ(t) = z(τˆ(t)) (19)
We are now ready to prove the main result of this section:
Proposition 3.6. For any interior initial condition x = x(0) such that neither
x1 = x2 = x3 nor x5 = x6 = x7, the solution of the replicator dynamics
converges to Γ567. In particular, all pure strategies in the support of the unique
equilibrium of game (12) are eliminated.
6The top-left and bottom-right RPS games of (12) need not be the the same for the
results to hold, this is just to minimize the number of parameters.
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Proof. The assumptions imply that x¯(0) and xˆ(0) are well defined and different
from (1
3
, 1
3
, 1
3
). We must show that x(t) converges to Γ567.
If λ(t) → 0, then x(t) converges to the face λ = 0. Since on this face
the payoff of strategy 4 is strictly smaller than the payoff of n567, standard,
domination-like arguments imply that x4(t) → 0, hence µ(t) → 1 (see, e.g.,
Samuelson and Zhang, 1992). Due to (19) and Proposition 3.1, this implies
that x(t)→ Γ567 and we are done. Thus it suffices to show that λ(t) converges
to zero.
Assume by contradiction that this is not the case.
Claim 3.7. Recall that τ¯ (t) =
∫ t
0
λ(s)ds. We have: τ¯(t)→ +∞ as t→ +∞.
Proof. λ(t)9 0 and λ is clearly Lipschitz.
Claim 3.8. lim supt→+∞
∫ t
0
[4x3(s)− 3λ(s)] ds = +∞
Proof. By (17), definition of τ¯ , and a change of variable,
∫ t
0
λ(s)x¯(s) ds =
∫ t
0
˙¯τ(s)y(τ¯(s)) ds =
∫ τ¯(t)
0
y(s) ds.
Therefore∫ t
0
(4x3(s)− 3λ(s)) ds =
∫ t
0
λ(s)(4x¯3(s)− 3) ds =
∫ τ¯(t)
0
(4y3(s)− 3) ds
Since y(0) 6= (1/3, 1/3, 1/3), the result follows from Claim 3.7 and Eq. (11).
Claim 3.9. lim sup
t→+∞
µ(t) ≥
1
1 + ε
Proof. Using (REP), an easy computation shows that
d
dt
ln
(x4
λ
)
= 4x3 + 10x4 − 2λ− λx¯ · U¯x¯− εµ ≥ 4x3 + 10x4 − 2λ− εµ (20)
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where the inequality follows from Lemma 3.2.
Assume by contradiction that lim supt→+∞ µ(t) <
1
1+ε
. Thus, omitting time
arguments, there exists a time T such that for all t ≥ T , (1+ε)µ < 1 = µ+λ+x4
hence εµ ≤ λ+ x4. Together with (20), this implies that for t ≥ T :
d
dt
ln
(x4
λ
)
≥ 4x3 + 9x4 − 3λ ≥ 4x3 − 3λ (21)
By Claim 3.8, it follows that lim sup ln(x4/λ) = +∞. Thus, there exists a time
T ′ > T such that x4 ≥ λ. Due to the first inequality in (21), for t ≥ T
′, x4
remains greater than λ and d
dt
ln
(
x4
λ
)
≥ 9x4 − 3λ ≥ 6λ. By Claim 3.7, this
implies that x4/λ→ +∞ hence λ→ 0, a contradiction.
We now conclude. Recall the definition of τˆ in (18). A corollary of Claim
3.9 is that τˆ (t) → +∞ as t → +∞. By (19) and Proposition 3.1, it follows
that xˆ converges to the heteroclinic cycle of game (9). It is easy to check that
along this cycle, the mean payoff is always greater than −1
4
. Therefore:
∃T1 ≥ 0, ∀t ≥ T1, xˆ(t) · Uˆxˆ(t) ≥ −
1
4
− ε (22)
Moreover, (REP) and a somewhat tedious computation show that:
d
dt
ln
(µ
λ
)
= µ
(
xˆ · Uˆxˆ+
1
3
− ε
)
− λ.
(
1
3
+ x¯ · U¯x¯
)
+ 20x4 (23)
Assuming ε ≤ 1
48
, (22), (23) and Lemma 3.2 imply that for t ≥ T1:
d
dt
ln
(µ
λ
)
≥
µ
24
−
λ
3
(24)
It follows from Claim 3.9 that there exists a time T2 ≥ T1 at which the ratio
µ/λ is greater than 16. By (24), this ratio then keeps increasing hence, by (24)
again,
∀t ≥ T2,
d
dt
ln
(µ
λ
)
(t) ≥
16λ
24
−
λ
3
≥
λ(t)
3
(25)
By Claim 3.7, this implies that λ goes to zero, a final contradiction.
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Perturbation of payoffs. As for game (6), any game sufficiently close to
game (12) in the payoff space has a unique Nash equilibrium, and its support is
{1, 2, 3}×{1, 2, 3}. We conjecture that the result of Proposition 3.6 generalizes
to such nearby games. That is, for almost all initial conditions, the solution
of the replicator dynamics converges to the boundary of the face spanned by
e5, e6 and e7, hence all pure strategies in the support of the unique Nash
equilibrium are eliminated. Our proof does not go through however, because
Lemma 3.5 requires a very specific payoff structure.
Correlated equilibrium. By contrast with the games of Viossat (2007,
2008), the Nash equilibrium of games (6) and (12) is not the unique correlated
equilibrium. Whether reasonable dynamics may eliminate all strategies used
in correlated equilibrium for almost all initial conditions is an open question.
Other dynamics. A variant of Lemma 3.5 holds for the discrete-time
replicator dynamics:
xi(n+ 1) = xi(n)
C + (Ux)i
C + x ·Ux
with C > −min
i,x
(Ux)i (26)
Thus, extending Proposition 3.6 to (26) should be relatively simple. Proposi-
tion 3.6 might also extend to some classes of payoff functionnal dynamics
x˙i = xi
[
f([Ux]i)−
∑
j
xjf([Ux]j)
]
(27)
and f an increasing and sufficiently smooth function from R to R. This might
be hard to prove though, as Lemma 3.5 builds on linearity properties which
are specific of the replicator dynamics.7
7One reason to hope for a generalization is that, in Rock-Paper-Scissors games, close to
the equilibrium, dynamics (27) behave as the replicator dynamics (Hofbauer and Sigmund,
1998, exercice 8.1.1; Viossat, 2011, footnote 6).
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Finally, there is a strong link between the best-reply dynamics and the
time-average of the replicator dynamics (Gaunersdorfer and Hofbauer, 1995;
Hofbauer et al., 2009). For this reason, we conjecture that Proposition 2.4 ex-
tends to (REP); that is, in game (6), for almost all initial conditions, all strate-
gies in the support of the equilibrium are eliminated under (REP). What we
can show, in the same spirit, is that Proposition 3.6 extends to the best-reply
dynamics, up to replacement of the heteroclinic cycle Γ567 by the corresponding
Shapley triangle:
ST567 :=
{
x ∈ S7 : x5 + x6 + x7 = 1 and max
5≤i≤7
(Ux)i = 0
}
Proposition 3.10. Assume that 0 < ε < 2/9. For any initial condition x
such that neither x1 = x2 = x3 nor x5 = x6 = x7, all solutions of the best-reply
dynamics converge to the Shapley triangle ST567.
Proof. See Appendix B. Compared to Proposition 2.4, the added difficulty is
to deal with initial conditions through which several solutions of (BR) exist.
This can be done due to a decomposition of the best-reply dynamics similar
to Lemma 3.5.
4 Discussion
In game (12), the Nash equilibrium is unique and quasi-strict, and therefore
persistent, regular, hence strongly stable, essential, strictly proper, strictly per-
fect, etc. (van Damme, 1991) Thus, from the traditional, rationalistic point of
view, it may be seen as the unambiguous solution of the game. However, under
two of the most studied dynamics, all strategies in the support of this Nash
equilibrium are eliminated from almost all initial conditions. This indicates
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an even wider gap between strategic and evolutionary considerations that had
been noted before.
We conjecture that elimination of all strategies in the support of Nash
equilibria from almost all initial conditions occurs for many other dynamics,
including multi-population dynamics. However, this might be hard to prove
because this can only arise in relatively large games, in which having a precise
understanding of dynamics more complex than the replicator dynamics or
the best-reply dynamics might prove difficult. A way forward might be to
consider nonlinear games and to replace, in the construction, Rock-Paper-
Scissors games by hypnodisk games (Hofbauer and Sandholm, 2011).
A Equilibrium uniqueness
In this section, we show that games (6) and (12) have a unique equilibrium.
We begin with a lemma used in both proofs.
Consider a symmetric bimatrix game with pure strategy set I = {1, 2, ..., N}
and payoff matrix U. Let I ′ ⊂ I. For any x in SN , define x
′ ∈ RN+ by x
′
i = xi
if i ∈ I ′ and x′i = 0 otherwise. Let x(I
′) =
∑
i∈I′ xi.
Lemma A.1. Let (x, y) be a Nash equilibrium such that x(I ′)y(I ′) > 0. As-
sume that against x − x′ and y − y′, the payoffs of a strategy i in I ′ is inde-
pendent of i. That is, for all i and j in I ′,
[U(y− y′)]i = [U(y− y
′)]j and [U(x− x
′)]i = [U(x− x
′)]j (28)
Then (x′, y′) induces an unnormalized Nash equilibrium of the game restricted
to I ′ × I ′. That is, for all i, j in I ′:
x′i > 0⇒ (Uy
′)i ≥ (Uy
′)j and y
′
i > 0⇒ (Ux
′)i ≥ (Ux
′)j (29)
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Proof. Let i ∈ I ′. If x′i > 0 then xi > 0, hence strategy i is a best-reply
to y. Together with (28) this implies that for all j in I ′, (Uy′)i − (Uy
′)j =
(Uy)i − (Uy)j ≥ 0. This proves the first part of (29). The second part is
symmetric.
Proof of proposition 2.3. Let (x,y) be a Nash equilibrium of (6). We want
to show that x = y = n123 = (1/3, 1/3, 1/3, 0, 0, 0).
Step 1. x4x5x6 = 0 and by symmetry y4y5y6 = 0.
Indeed, if x4x5x6 > 0, then strategies 4, 5 and 6 are all best replies to y,
hence so is n456. This cannot be because, as is easily checked, n456 is strictly
dominated by n123.
Step 2. y1 + y2 + y3 > 0 and by symmetry x1 + x2 + x3 > 0.
Assume by contradiction that y1 = y2 = y3 = 0. It follows that
∀i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, (Uy)i = −1 < 0 (30)
Furthermore, due to Step 1, y has support in {4, 5}, {5, 6} or {4, 6}. In any
case, there exists i in {4, 5, 6} such that (Uy)i ≥ 0. Together with (30), this
implies that strategies 1, 2 and 3 are not best replies to y, hence x1 = x2 =
x3 = 0. Thus, both x and y have support in {4, 5, 6}, hence (x,y) induces a
Nash equilibrium of the game restricted to {4, 5, 6} × {4, 5, 6}. This implies
that x = y = n456, which contradicts Step 1.
Step 3. x1 = x2 = x3 and y1 = y2 = y3.
Let x123 = (x1, x2, x3, 0, 0, 0) and x456 = x − x123 = (0, 0, 0, x4, x5, x6). Define
y123 and y456 symmetrically. For every i and j in {1, 2, 3}, we have (Ux456)i =
(Ux456)j and (Uy456)i = (Uy456)j. Therefore, if follows from Step 2 and from
Lemma A.1 applied with I ′ = {1, 2, 3} that (x123,y123) is an unnormalized
Nash equilibrium of the game restricted to {1, 2, 3} × {1, 2, 3}. Therefore x
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and y are both proportional to n123.
Step 4. x4 + x5 + x6 = 0 and by symmetry y4 + y5 + y6 = 0.
Assume by contradiction that x4 + x5 + x6 > 0. Against n123, every strategy
i in {4, 5, 6} earns the same payoff: −5/3. Thus, by Step 3, for every i and j
in {4, 5, 6}, we have (Ux123)i = (Ux123)j and (Uy123)i = (Uy123)j . Together
with lemma A.1 with I ′ = {4, 5, 6}, this implies that if y4+y5+y6 > 0 then x456
and y456 are proportional to n456, hence x4x5x6 > 0. This cannot be due to
Step 1. Therefore, y4+ y5+ y6 = 0. But then, by Step 3, y = n123. Therefore,
strategies 4, 5 and 6 are not best replies to y. Therefore x4 = x5 = x6 = 0.
Proposition 2.4 now follows from Steps 3 and 4.
Proof of proposition 3.3. Recall the definition of n123 and n567:
n123 =
(
1
3
,
1
3
,
1
3
, 0, 0, 0, 0
)
; n567 =
(
0, 0, 0, 0,
1
3
,
1
3
,
1
3
)
.
Let (x,y) be a Nash equilibrium of (12). Consider the conditions:
x1 + x2 + x3 > 0 and y1 + y2 + y3 > 0 (31)
x5 + x6 + x7 > 0 and y5 + y6 + y7 > 0 (32)
Note that, due to Lemma A.1:
Lemma A.2. If (31) holds, then x1 = x2 = x3 and y1 = y2 = y3. If (32)
holds, then x5 = x6 = x7 and y5 = y6 = y7.
Now examines 4 cases, depending on whether (31) and (32) hold or not:
Case 1. If (31) holds. Then, by lemma A.2, y1 = y2 = y3. Therefore
n567 ·Uy > (Uy)4, hence x4 = 0. By symmetry, y4 = 0.
Subcase 1.1. If furthermore (32) holds. Then by lemma A.2, y5 = y6 = y7.
Since y4 = 0 and y1 = y2 = y3, it follows that y is a convex combination of
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n123 and n567. Against both of these strategies, the payoff of n123 is strictly
greater than the payoff of strategies 5, 6 and 7. Thus, the latter cannot be
best-replies to y, hence x5 + x6 + x7 = 0. This contradicts (32).
Subcase 1.2. If (32) does not hold. Without loss of generality, assume that
y5 + y6 + y7 = 0. Since y4 = 0 and y1 = y2 = y3, this implies that y = n123.
Therefore, as above, none of the strategies 5, 6 and 7 is a best reply to y.
Therefore x5 + x6 + x7 = 0 which by the same argument implies x = n123.
Therefore, x = y = n123.
Case 2. If (31) does not hold. Without loss of generality, assume x1+x2+
x3 = 0. This implies that n567 is a strictly better response to x than strategy
4. Thus, y4 = 0.
Subcase 2.1. If furthermore (32) holds. Then y is a convex combination
of n567 and strategies 1, 2, 3. This implies that n123 is a strictly better response
to y than either 5, 6 or 7. Therefore, x5 = x6 = x7 = 0, contradicting (32).
Subcase 2.2. If (32) does not hold. Then x5+x6+x7 = 0 or y5+y6+y7 = 0.
In the latter case, since y4 = 0, it follows that y has support in {1, 2, 3}, hence
that n123 is a strictly better response to y than either 5, 6, or 7; therefore, in
any case, x5 + x6 + x7 = 0. Since we assumed x1 + x2 + x3 = 0, it follows that
x = e4. Therefore, y must have support in {5, 6, 7}. It follows that x is not a
best-reply to y, a contradiction.
Summing up, only subcase 1.2 is possible, and then x = y = n123.
B Best-reply dynamics in the 7× 7 game (12)
This section proves Proposition 3.10. Recall the notation of Section 3: λ, µ,
x¯, xˆ, U¯ and Uˆ. Consider a solution of (BR) in game (12) such that initially
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neither x1 = x2 = x3 nor x5 = x6 = x7. Thus, λ(0) > 0, µ(0) > 0, x¯(0) 6=
(1/3, 1/3, 1/3) and xˆ(0) 6= (1/3, 1/3, 1/3). This implies that λ(t) and µ(t) are
positive for all t ≥ 0, as they can decrease at most exponentially.
We first show that, up to a change of velocity, x¯ and xˆ follow the best-
reply dynamics in the RPS game (9). Below, BR(·) denotes the best-reply
correspondence in game (9).
Lemma B.1. For almost all times t:
˙¯x ∈
(
1 +
λ˙
λ
)
(BR(x¯)− x¯) and ˙ˆx ∈
(
1 +
µ˙
µ
)
(BR(xˆ)− xˆ)
Proof. We prove the first part. The proof of the second part is the same. Let
b ∈ BR(x(t)) such that x˙(t) = b− x(t).
Case 1: if bi = 0 for all i = 1, 2, 3. Then x˙i = −xi for all i = 1, 2, 3. This
implies that ˙¯x = 0 and that λ˙ = −λ, so that the result holds trivially.
Case 2. Otherwise, define b¯ as x¯. A few lines of algebra show that, indepen-
dently of the payoffs:
˙¯x =
(
1 +
λ˙
λ
)(
b¯− x¯
)
(33)
Moreover, since all strategies in {1, 2, 3} earn the same payoffs against strate-
gies in {4, 5, 6, 7}, a variant of Lemma A.1 shows that b¯ ∈ BR(x¯), hence the
result.
Recall the definition of the Shapley triangle in (5).
Lemma B.2. If λ(t) (resp. µ(t)) does not converge to 0, then the limit set
of x¯(t) (resp. xˆ(t)) is the Shapley triangle (5) hence maxi(U¯x¯)i → 0 (resp.
maxi(Uˆxˆ)i → 0).
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Proof. We only prove the first part (with λ(t)). The proof of the second part is
the same. Let y(·) be the unique solution of the best-reply dynamics in game
(4) with initial condition y(0) = x¯(0). Let τ(t) denote the rescaled time:
τ(t) :=
∫ t
0
(
1 +
λ˙
λ
(s)
)
ds = t+ ln
(
λ(t)
λ(0)
)
(34)
Note that τ(t) is nondecreasing as, due to (BR), λ˙ ≥ −λ. Moreover lim sup λ(t) >
0, hence τ(t) → +∞ by (34). Furthermore, it follows from (B.1) that for all
t ≥ 0, x¯(t) = y(τ(t)). The result now follows from Proposition 2.1.
Lemma B.3. There exists a time T > 0 such that none of the strategies 1, 2
and 3 is a best-reply to x(T ).
Proof. Assume by contradiction that for all t ≥ 0,
(i) (Ux)4 − max
1≤i≤3
(Ux)i ≤ 0 and (ii) max
5≤i≤7
(Ux)i − max
1≤i≤3
(Ux)i ≤ 0 (35)
Note that the payoff of a strategy i in {1, 2, 3} may be written as
(Ux)i = λ(U¯x¯)i − 10x4 + µ(−1/3 + ε). (36)
Similarly, for all j in {5, 6, 7},
(Ux)j = −λ/3 + 10x4 + µ(Uˆxˆ)j′,with j
′ = j + 4. (37)
Note also that since e4 is not a best-reply to itself, x4(t) cannot converge to 1.
Now examine the following cases.
Case 1: if λ(t)→ 0. Then µ(t) does not converge to 0, thus it follows from
λ(t)→ 0, (37) and Lemma B.2 that
lim sup max
5≤i≤7
(Ux)i = lim sup
(
10x4 + µmax
i
(Uˆxˆ)i
)
≥ 0
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while lim supmax1≤i≤3(Ux)i ≤ −1/3 + ε < 0. This contradicts (ii) in (35).
Case 2: if λ(t) does not converge to 0. Then by Lemma B.2, x¯ converges to
the Shapley triangle (5) and there is a increasing sequence (tn) with tn → +∞
such that x¯(tn) → q¯, where q¯ is the vertex of the Shapley triangle defined in
(10).
Subcase 2.1. If µ(t)→ 0. Together with x¯(tn)→ q¯, this implies that for n
large enough, strategy 4 is a strictly better reply to x(tn) than strategies 1,2
and 3; this contradicts part (i) of (35).
Subcase 2.2. If µ(t) does not converge to 0. Then by Lemma B.2 and (5),
maxi(U¯x¯)i → 0 and maxi(Uˆxˆ)i → 0. Together with (36), (37), their analog
for strategy 4 and (35), this implies that along the sequence (tn):
(Ux)4 − max
1≤i≤3
(Ux)i = λ [(Uq)4 − o(1)] + 10x4 − εµ ≤ 0 (38)
where q = (q¯1, q¯2, q¯3, 0, 0, 0, 0), and
max
5≤i≤7
(Ux)i − max
1≤i≤3
(Ux)i = −
λ
3
+ 20x4 + µ
(
1
3
− ε
)
+ o(1) ≤ 0 (39)
Roughly, (38) implies that λ/µ should be small and (39) that λ/µ should be
large. Assuming conservatively that x4 = 0, hence µ = 1− λ, these equations
may be shown to be incompatible for ε < 2/9.
We now conclude. By Lemma B.3, there exists a time T such that none
of the strategies 1, 2 and 3 is a best-reply to x(T ). Moreover, due to Lemma
B.1, for all t ≥ 0, xˆ(t) 6= (1/3, 1/3, 1/3), hence by a variant of Lemma A.1,
strategies 5, 6 and 7 cannot all be best-replies to x(t). Thus, due to the cyclic
symmetry of strategies 5 to 7, we may assume that the set of pure best-replies
to x(T ) is one of the followings:
Case 1 : {5} or {5, 6} ; Case 2 : {4, 6} or {4, 5, 6} ; or Case 3 : {4}
28
In Case 1, the same arguments as in Proposition 2.4 show that x(t) →
ST567. In Case 2, since strategy 4 is strictly dominated by strategy 6 on the
face spanned by e4, e5 and e6, it immediately ceases to be a best-reply. This
leads to Case 1. In Case 3, since e4 is not a best-reply to itself, there exists
a first time T ′ > T at which e4 is not the unique best-reply to x(t). Due to
the improvement principle (Lemma 2.2), none of the strategies 1, 2 and 3 is a
best-reply to x(T ′). Thus we are back to Case 2. This concludes the proof.
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